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Abstract:  The three-step test is central to 
the regulation of copyright limitations at the inter-
national level.1 Delineating the room for exemptions 
with abstract criteria, the three-step test is by far the 
most important and comprehensive basis for the in-
troduction of national use privileges. It is an essential, 
flexible element in the international limitation infra-
structure that allows national law makers to satisfy 
domestic social, cultural, and economic needs. Given 
the universal field of application that follows from 
the test’s open-ended wording, the provision creates 
much more breathing space than the more specific 
exceptions recognized in international copyright law.2
EC copyright legislation, however, fails to take ad-
vantage of the flexibility inherent in the three-step 
test. Instead of using the international provision as 
a means to open up the closed EC catalogue of per-
missible exceptions, offer sufficient breathing space 
for social, cultural, and economic needs, and en-
able EC copyright law to keep pace with the rapid 
development of the Internet, the Copyright Direc-
tive 2001/29/EC encourages the application of the 
three-step test to further restrict statutory excep-
tions that are often defined narrowly in national leg-
islation anyway.3
In the current online environment, however, en-
hanced flexibility in the field of copyright limitations 
is indispensable. From a social and cultural perspec-
tive, the web 2.0 promotes and enhances freedom of 
expression and information with its advanced search 
engine services, interactive platforms, and various 
forms of user-generated content. From an economic 
perspective, it creates a parallel universe of tradi-
tional content providers relying on copyright protec-
tion, and emerging Internet industries whose further 
development depends on robust copyright limita-
tions. In particular, the newcomers in the online mar-
ket – social networking sites, video forums, and vir-
tual worlds – promise a remarkable potential for 
economic growth that has already attracted the at-
tention of the OECD.4
Against this background, the time is ripe to debate 
the introduction of an EC fair use doctrine on the ba-
sis of the three-step test. Otherwise, EC copyright 
law is likely to frustrate important opportunities for 
cultural, social, and economic development. To lay 
groundwork for the debate, the differences between 
the continental European and the Anglo-American 
approach to copyright limitations (section 1), and the 
specific merits of these two distinct approaches (sec-
tion 2), will be discussed first. An analysis of current 
problems that have arisen under the present dys-
functional EC system (section 3) will then serve as a 
starting point for proposing an EC fair use doctrine 
based on the three-step test (section 4). Drawing 
conclusions, the international dimension of this fair 
use proposal will be considered (section 5).
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A. Copyright’s Legal Traditions
1	 International law making and harmonization activ-
ities have led to a remarkable approximation of An-
glo-American copyright and continental European 
droit d’auteur. To this day, however, the approach to 
copyright limitations differs significantly: Whereas 
continental European countries provide for a closed 
catalogue of carefully defined exceptions, the Anglo-
American copyright tradition allows for an open-
ended fair use system that leaves the task of iden-
tifying individual cases of exempted unauthorized 
use to the courts. 
2	 Reflecting the continental European approach, Ar-
ticle 5 of the EC Copyright Directive sets forth var-
ious types of specific copyright exceptions. Besides 
the mandatory exemption of temporary acts of re-
production to be implemented by all member states, 
Article 5 contains optional exceptions that relate to 
private copying; use of copyrighted material by li-
braries, museums, and archives; ephemeral record-
ings; reproductions of broadcasts made by hospitals 
and prisons; illustrations for teaching or scientific 
research; use for the benefit of people with a dis-
ability; press privileges; use for the purpose of quo-
tations, caricature, parody, and pastiche; use for the 
purposes of public security and for the proper per-
formance or reporting of administrative, parliamen-
tary, or judicial proceedings; use of political speeches 
and public lectures; use during religious or official 
celebrations; use of architectural works located per-
manently in public places; incidental inclusions of a 
work in other material; use for the purpose of ad-
vertising the public exhibition or sale of artistic 
works; use in connection with the demonstration 
or repair of equipment; use for the reconstruction 
of buildings; and additional cases of use having mi-
nor importance.
3	 A prominent example of the Anglo-American ap-
proach to copyright limitations is the fair use doc-
trine that has evolved in the United States. Section 
107 of the U.S. Copyright Act permits the unauthor-
ized use of copyrighted material for purposes “such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching […], 
scholarship, or research.”5 To guide the decision on 
individual forms of use, four factors are set forth 
in the provision which shall be taken into account 
among other considerations that may be relevant 
in a given case:
(1)  the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes;
4	 (2)  the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.6
5	 On the basis of this legislative framework and es-
tablished case law, U.S. courts conduct a case-by-
case analysis in order to determine whether a given 
use can be exempted from the control of the copy-
right holder.7 
6	 The remarkable difference in the regulation of 
copyright limitations becomes understandable in 
the light of the theoretical groundwork underlying 
common law and civil law copyright systems. The 
fair use approach can be traced back to the utili-
tarian foundation of the Anglo-American copyright 
tradition that perceives copyright as a prerogative 
granted to enhance the overall welfare of society 
by ensuring a sufficient supply of knowledge and 
information.8 This theoretical basis only justifies 
rights strong enough to induce the desired produc-
tion of intellectual works. Therefore, the exclusive 
rights of authors deserve individual positive legal 
enactment.9 Those forms of use that need not be re-
served for the right owner to provide the necessary 
incentive remain free. Otherwise, rights would be 
awarded that are unnecessary to achieve the goals 
of the system. In sum, exclusive rights are thus de-
lineated precisely, while their limitation can be reg-
ulated flexibly in open-ended provisions, such as fair 
use.10 Oversimplifying the theoretical model under-
lying common law copyright, it might be said that 
freedom of use is the rule; rights are the exception. 
7	 The opposite constellation – rights the rule, freedom 
the exception – follows from the natural law under-
pinning of continental European droit d’auteur. In 
the natural law theory, the author occupies center 
stage.11 A literary or artistic work is perceived as a 
materialization of the author’s personality. Accord-
ingly, it is assumed that a bond unites the author 
with the object of her creation.12 Moreover, the au-
thor acquires a property right in her work by virtue 
of the mere act of creation. This has the corollary 
that nothing is left to the law apart from formally 
recognizing what is already inherent in the “very 
nature of things.”13 The author-centrism of the civil 
law system calls on the legislator to safeguard rights 
broad enough to concede to authors the opportunity 
to profit from the use of their self-expression, and 
to bar factors that might stymie their exploitation. 
In consequence, civil law copyright systems recog-
nize flexible, broad exclusive rights. Exceptions, by 
contrast, are defined narrowly and often interpreted 
restrictively.14
B. Flexibility and Legal Certainty
8	 Both approaches to copyright limitations have spe-
cific merits. Precisely defined exceptions in conti-
nental European countries may offer a high degree of 
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legal certainty.15 With a closed catalogue of permis-
sible exceptions and a detailed description of their 
scope, it becomes foreseeable for users and investors 
which forms of use fall under the control of the copy-
right holder and can serve as a basis for the exploita-
tion of copyrighted material, and which acts of un-
authorized use remain outside this controlled area 
and can be carried out without infringing copyright.
9	 The central advantage of the Anglo-American fair 
use approach, however, is flexibility. Within a flexi-
ble fair use framework, the courts can broaden and 
restrict the scope of copyright limitations to safe-
guard copyright’s delicate balance between exclusive 
rights and competing social, cultural, and economic 
needs. Judges are rendered capable of adapting the 
copyright limitation infrastructure to new circum-
stances and challenges, such as the digital environ-
ment. Leaving this discretion to the courts reduces 
the need for constant amendments to legislation that 
may have difficulty in keeping pace with the speed 
of technological development.16 
10	 These benefits accruing from flexible copyright lim-
itations must not be underestimated in the present 
situation. Flexible rights necessitate flexible limitations. 
With advanced copyright systems offering flexi-
ble, broad exclusive rights, it is wise to adopt fair 
use defenses as a counterbalance. In this way, the 
risk of counterproductive overprotection can be 
minimized. On the basis of an elastic fair use test, 
the courts can keep the broad grant of protection 
within reasonable limits and inhibit exclusive rights 
from unduly curtailing competing freedoms, such 
as freedom of expression and freedom of competi-
tion.17 This becomes obvious in the ongoing process 
of adapting copyright law to the rapid development 
of the Internet. Broad copyright protection is likely 
to absorb and restrict new possibilities of use even 
though this may be undesirable from the perspective 
of social, cultural, or economic needs.18 User-gener-
ated content, advanced search engine services, and 
the digitization of cultural material can serve as ex-
amples of current phenomena requiring the recon-
sideration of the scope of copyright limitations.19 
Without sufficient breathing space, important so-
cial, cultural, and economic benefits that could be 
derived from timely adaptations of the legal frame-
work are likely to be lost.
C. EC Worst Case Scenario
11	 Considering these options, law makers can be ex-
pected to realize at least one of the outlined poten-
tial advantages – enhanced legal certainty on the 
basis of precisely defined exceptions or sufficient 
flexibility resulting from open-ended fair use leg-
islation. In the light of important opportunities of-
fered by the rapid development of the Internet, the 
advantage of flexibility may even be deemed more 
important than the benefits of enhanced legal cer-
tainty.20 Instead of following these guidelines, how-
ever, the drafters of EC copyright law developed a 
system that frustrates both objectives. The present 
regulation of copyright limitations in the EC offers 
neither legal certainty nor sufficient flexibility. The ad-
aptation of EC copyright law to the digital environ-
ment has led to a legislative framework that em-
ploys the open-ended three-step test to erode the 
legal certainty following from precisely defined ex-
ceptions instead of using the test as a means of pro-
viding sufficient flexibility.21 
12	 To establish this inconsistent system, elements of 
both traditions of copyright law have been combined 
in the most unfortunate way. In the EC Copyright Di-
rective, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article 5 set forth 
the closed catalogue of exceptions described above. 
This enumeration of permissible exceptions is in line 
with the continental European copyright tradition. 
The listed exceptions, however, are subject to the EC 
three-step test laid down in paragraph 5 of Article 5. 
As the test consists of several open-ended criteria, 
it recalls the Anglo-American copyright tradition.22 
However, the interplay between the two elements – 
the closed catalogue and the open three-step test – 
is regulated as follows:
“The exceptions and limitations provided for in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be applied in cer-
tain special cases which do not conflict with a nor-
mal exploitation of the work or other subject-mat-
ter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rightholder.”23
13	 This approach, inevitably, leads to a dilemma. As 
discussed, a closed list of precisely defined excep-
tions may have the advantage of enhanced legal cer-
tainty. This potential advantage, however, is beyond 
reach under the current EC system. If national legis-
lation adopts and further specifies exceptions listed 
in the EC catalogue, these specific national excep-
tions may still be challenged on the grounds that 
they are incompatible with the EC three-step test. 
In other words, national exceptions that are embed-
ded in a national framework of precisely defined use 
privileges may further be restricted by invoking the 
open-ended three-step test. On the one hand, na-
tional copyright exceptions are thus straitjacketed. 
Their validity is hanging by the thread of compli-
ance with the abstract criteria of the EC three-step 
test. On the other hand, the test itself may only be 
invoked to place additional constraints on national 
exceptions that are defined narrowly anyway. Un-
like fair use provisions with comparable abstract cri-
teria, the EC three-step test cannot be employed by 
the courts to create new, additional forms of permit-
ted unauthorized use. Hence, it is impossible to real-
ize the central advantage of flexibility that is inher-
ent in the test’s open-ended wording.24 
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14	 In consequence, the current EC system fails to real-
ize any advantage that may follow from the outlined 
Anglo-American or continental European approach 
to copyright limitations. The corrosive effect of this 
dysfunctional concept can currently be observed in 
EC member states. The following overview of Dutch 
(section 3.1), French (section 3.2), and German (sec-
tion 3.3) case law gives evidence of the need to re-
consider the current legislation (section 3.4).
I. Legal Uncertainty: 
The Netherlands
15	 Dutch courts already applied the three-step test 
prior to the Copyright Directive.25 On the one hand, 
the adoption and implementation of the Directive 
led to more frequent references to the three-step 
test that are made to confirm and strengthen find-
ings equally following from domestic rules.26 This 
way of applying the three-step test has little impact 
on the Dutch catalogue of statutory exceptions. On 
the other hand, however, the Directive inspired a 
line of decisions that use the three-step test to over-
ride the closed Dutch system of precisely defined 
user privileges.
16	 In a ruling of March 2, 2005, the District Court of The 
Hague forced the long-standing exception for press 
reviews onto the sidelines, and invoked the three-
step test of the Copyright Directive instead.27 The 
case concerned the unauthorized scanning and re-
production of press articles for internal electronic 
communication (via e-mail, intranet, etc.) in minis-
tries – a practice that also offered certain search and 
archive functions. Seeking to determine whether 
this practice was permissible, the Court refused to 
consider several questions raised by the parties with 
regard to the specific rules laid down in Article 15 
of the Dutch Copyright Act and Article 5(3)(c) of the 
EC Copyright Directive. In the Court’s view, consid-
eration of these specific rules was unnecessary be-
cause the contested use did not meet the require-
ments of the EC three-step test anyway:
“The reason for leaving these three questions un-
answered is that the digital press review practice of 
the State, in the opinion of the court, does not com-
ply with the so-called three-step test of Article 5(5) 
of the Copyright Directive.”28 
17	 The subsequent discussion of non-compliance with 
the three-step test resembles a U.S. fair use analysis 
rather than a close inspection of a continental Eu-
ropean statutory limitation. In particular, the Court 
stresses the growing importance of digital newspa-
per exploitation and the impact of digital press re-
views on this promising market. The ministry press 
reviews are held to “endanger” a normal exploita-
tion of press articles and unreasonably prejudice the 
publisher’s legitimate interest in digital commercial-
ization.29 Under the fourth U.S. fair use factor “effect 
of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work,” similar considerations could 
play a decisive role.30 
18	 The focus on the three-step test, constituting the 
basis of the Court’s reasoning in the press review 
case, inevitably marginalizes the detailed rules es-
tablished in Dutch law. On its merits, the applicable 
statutory limitation laid down in Article 15 of the 
Dutch Copyright Act merely opens the door to the 
three-step test. As a result, however, it is rendered 
incapable of influencing the further test procedure.31 
19	 In a more recent decision of June 25, 2008, the Dis-
trict Court of The Hague invoked the three-step test 
again in a case concerning the payment of equitable 
remuneration for private copying activities. In this 
context, the Court devoted attention to the question 
of use of an illegal source as a basis for private copy-
ing.32 The detailed regulation of private copying in 
Article 16c of the Dutch Copyright Act does not con-
tain any indication to the effect that private copying 
from an illegal source is to be deemed impermissible. 
The drafting history of the provision, by contrast, 
reflects the clear intention of the Dutch legislator 
to exempt private copying irrespective of whether 
a legal or illegal source is used.33 Having recourse to 
the three-step test of Article 5(5) of the Copyright 
Directive, the District Court of The Hague nonethe-
less dismantled this seemingly robust edifice of le-
gal certainty in one single sentence. Without offer-
ing a detailed analysis, the Court stated that private 
copying from an illegal source was “in conflict with 
the three-step test.” Accordingly, it was held to fall 
outside the private copying exemption of Article 16c:
“In the parliamentary history, there are indications 
of a different interpretation. However, the interpre-
tation advocated by the minister and supported by 
the government – assuming that private copying 
from an illegal source was legal – is in conflict with 
the three-step test of Article 5(5) of the Directive.”34
20	 The central point here is not the prohibition of pri-
vate copying using illegal sources. It is the erosion 
of the central argument weighing in favor of pre-
cisely defined exceptions and against a fair use sys-
tem. Regardless of precise definitions given in the 
Dutch Copyright Act, the ruling of the Court min-
imizes the degree of legal certainty in the field of 
copyright limitations. Users of copyrighted material 
in the Netherlands can no longer rely on the wording 
of the applicable statutory exception. On the basis of 
the EC three-step test, a certain use may be held to 
amount to copyright infringement even though it is 
exempted from the authorization of the rightholder 
in the Dutch Copyright Act.35 Hence, the degree of 
legal certainty can hardly be deemed higher than 
the degree attained in a fair use system. Arguably, 
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the standard of certainty is even lower because the 
additional scrutiny of precisely defined exceptions 
in the light of the three-step test is not reflected in 
the Dutch Copyright Act. In copyright systems with 
a statutory fair use provision, by contrast, the factors 
applied by the courts are clearly stated in the law. 
Consulting Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, us-
ers of copyrighted material in the U.S., for instance, 
can inform themselves about the criteria that the 
courts will consider when determining the permis-
sibility of a given unauthorized use.
II. Inflexibility: France
21	 Admittedly, this problem of insufficient transpar-
ency can easily be solved by incorporating the three-
step test of the EC Copyright Directive into national 
law. In EC member states following this approach,36 
the tension between precisely defined exceptions 
on the one hand, and additional control on the ba-
sis of the abstract criteria of the three-step test on 
the other hand, is made obvious for users relying on 
copyright exceptions. In France, for instance, it is ap-
parent from national legislation that use falling un-
der a copyright exception will additionally be scru-
tinized in the light of the three-step test. According 
to Article L. 122-5 of the French Intellectual Property 
Code, the listed statutory exceptions may neither 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work nor 
prejudice the author’s legitimate interests.37 
22	 The central problem raised by an additional exam-
ination of exceptions in the light of the three-step 
test, however, cannot be solved in this way. Although 
copyright exceptions are already defined precisely, 
their application still depends on compliance with 
the open-ended three-step test. As a result, the at-
tainable degree of legal certainty is reduced sub-
stantially when compared with the traditional con-
tinental European approach of precisely defined 
exceptions that are not examined additionally in 
the light of abstract criteria.38
23	 Moreover, the amalgam of specific statutory excep-
tions and the open-ended three-step test further di-
minishes the limited flexibility of systems with pre-
cisely defined use privileges. Like the reported Dutch 
cases, the French Mulholland Drive case gives evi-
dence of this freezing effect. The case was brought by 
a purchaser of a DVD of David Lynch’s film Mulholland 
Drive who sought to transfer the film into VHS for-
mat in order to watch it at his mother’s house. Tech-
nical protection measures applied by the film pro-
ducers prevented the making of the VHS copy.39 In 
this regard, the French Supreme Court held that the 
relevant Articles L. 122-5 and L. 211-3 of the French 
Intellectual Property Code had to be interpreted in 
the light of the three-step test. The exception for pri-
vate copying could not be invoked against the appli-
cation of technical protection measures when the in-
tended act of copying would conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work concerned.40 
24	 Examining the private copying exception in the light 
of this criterion of the three-step test, the French Su-
preme Court rejected the previous decision taken 
by the Paris Court of Appeals. The latter Court had 
ruled that the intended private copy did not en-
croach upon the film’s normal DVD exploitation.41 
The French Supreme Court reversed this holding 
for two reasons. On the one hand, it asserted that a 
conflict with a normal exploitation had to be deter-
mined against the background of the enhanced risk 
of piracy inherent in the digital environment. On 
the other hand, the Court underlined that the ex-
ploitation of cinematographic works on DVD was 
important for recouping the investment in film 
productions.42 
25	 The verdict of the French Supreme Court resembles 
the decisions taken in the Netherlands. It is based 
on the three-step test rather than the specific re-
quirements laid down in the national statutory ex-
ception. On its merits, the national exception merely 
constitutes a starting point for the Court to embark 
on a scrutiny of the contested use in the light of the 
three-step test. The result of this way of applying the 
test is the erosion of the French private copying ex-
ception in the digital environment.43 The Court em-
ploys the three-step test to place further constraints 
on the scope of the national exception. In conse-
quence, the limited flexibility of the French system 
of precisely defined exceptions is further restricted.
III. Alternative Routes: Germany
26	 German case law also testifies to the insufficient flex-
ibility of the current EC framework for copyright 
limitations. While the foregoing Dutch and French 
examples illustrate problems arising from the ap-
plication of the three-step test, developments in 
Germany show that the very basis of the current EC 
system – a closed catalogue of precisely defined ex-
ceptions – already renders the courts incapable of 
keeping pace with the constant evolution of new In-
ternet technologies. Complex questions about the 
scope of precisely defined exceptions arise particu-
larly with regard to the distribution of primary and 
secondary markets for information products and 
services.44 In the relation between copyright or da-
tabase owners and search engines, for instance, the 
right of quotation has become a crucial factor. 
27	 Implementing the EC Copyright Directive, legislators 
in EC member states, as indicated above, enjoyed the 
freedom to choose exceptions from the catalogue of 
Article 5 of the Directive and tailor the scope of re-
sulting use privileges to individual national needs. 
Apart from the mandatory exemption of temporary 
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acts of reproduction, the transposition of exceptions 
into national law is optional under the Copyright Di-
rective. In consequence, the domestic scope of an 
exception listed in Article 5 of the Directive, such as 
the right of quotation, may differ from country to 
country. These differences can have a deep impact 
on the information that may be displayed by search 
engines in EC member states without the authoriza-
tion of the copyright owner. 
28	 The Dutch legislator, for instance, decided to broaden 
the scope of the right of quotation during the imple-
mentation of the EC Copyright Directive. The long-
standing “context requirement” of Article 15a of the 
Dutch Copyright Act, according to which quotations 
had to serve the purpose of criticism and review, 
has been attenuated. In the amended version, the 
provision is also applicable to announcements and 
expressions serving comparable purposes. Accord-
ingly, the quotation right has been held to cover in-
formation made available by search engines on the 
grounds that these engines “announce” the contents 
of underlying source databases.45 In a case concern-
ing a search engine that collects information from 
the websites of housing agencies, the Court of Alk-
maar clarified that for the quotation right to apply, 
the reproduction and communication of collected 
data to the public had to keep within the limits of 
what was necessary to give a good impression of the 
housing offer concerned.46 The Court specified that, 
under this standard, it was permissible to provide 
search engine users with a description of up to 155 
characters, address and rent details, and one single 
picture not exceeding the format of 194x145 pixels.47 
29	 In Germany, by contrast, the traditional confinement 
of the quotation right to criticism and review was 
upheld when implementing the Copyright Directive. 
This more restrictive approach limits the room to 
maneuver for the courts. The District Court of Ham-
burg, for instance, refused to bring thumbnails of 
pictures displayed by Google’s image search service 
under the umbrella of the right of quotation. Before 
turning to an analysis of copyright exceptions, the 
Court clarified that a thumbnail did not have charac-
teristic features of its own that made the individual 
features of the original work fade away. Accordingly, 
there was no room for qualifying the conversion of 
pictures into thumbnails as a “free use” not falling 
under the exclusive rights of authors by virtue of § 
24 of the German Copyright Act.48 
30	 On this basis, the Court argued with regard to copy-
right exceptions that thumbnails could not be re-
garded as permissible quotations in the sense of § 
51 no. 2 of the German Copyright Act because they 
did not serve as evidence or argumentative basis for 
independent comment.49 The stricter German quo-
tation standard, still requiring use in the context of 
criticism and comment, thus prevented the Court 
from offering breathing space for the image-related 
search service in question. Interestingly, the District 
Court of Hamburg expressly recognized that search 
engines were of 
“essential importance for structuring the decen-
tralised architecture of the world wide web, local-
ising widely scattered contents and knowledge, and 
therefore, ultimately, for the functioning of a net-
worked society.”50 
31	 In spite of this “esteem for search engine services,” 
the Court did not feel in a position to interpret the 
German quotation right extensively to exempt the 
use of thumbnails for the image search system. As 
the right of quotation had been designed with an eye 
to use under different circumstances, the Court felt 
that it was the task of the legislator to intervene and 
reconcile the interests of authors and right owners 
with the strong public interest in access to graphi-
cal online information and the economic interests of 
search engine providers.51 In the absence of an open-
ended fair use provision, the Court was paralyzed by 
an inflexible limitation infrastructure.
32	 In a recent decision also dealing with Google’s im-
age search service, the German Federal Court of Jus-
tice confirmed that the unauthorized use of picture 
thumbnails did not fall under the right of quotation 
in § 51 of the German Copyright Act. To fulfill the 
traditional context requirement that had not been 
abandoned during the implementation of the Copy-
right Directive, the user making the quotation had 
to establish an inner connection between the quoted 
material and her own thoughts. This requirement 
was not satisfied in the case of picture thumbnails 
that were merely used to inform the public about 
contents available on the Internet.52 In this context, 
the Court stated that
“neither the technical developments concerning the 
dissemination of information on the Internet nor the 
interests of the parties which the exception seeks to 
protect justify an extensive interpretation of § 51 
of the German Copyright Act that goes beyond the 
purpose of making quotations. Neither the freedom 
of information of other Internet users, nor the free-
dom of communication or the freedom of trade of 
search engine providers, require such an extensive 
interpretation.”53
33	 This clarification indicates that the German Federal 
Court of Justice did not deem it necessary to solve 
the case on the basis of the right of quotation. By 
contrast, the Court followed an alternative route to 
create breathing space for the image search service 
at issue. While it refrained from inferring an implicit 
contractual license for search engine purposes from 
the mere act of making content available on the In-
ternet,54 the Court held that Google’s use of the pic-
tures was not unlawful because the copyright owner 
had consented implicitly to use of her material in the 
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image search service by making her works available 
online without employing technical means to block 
the automatic indexing and displaying of online con-
tent by search engines.55 
34	 It is unclear whether this solution on the basis of 
implicit consent will yield satisfactory results in all 
cases of contested search engine use. The case be-
fore the District Court of Hamburg, for instance, con-
cerned protected material that had not been made 
available by the copyright owner but by an unau-
thorized third party. In this constellation, implicit 
consent can hardly be assumed. Referring to this sit-
uation, the German Federal Court indicated that the 
search engine provider could rely on the safe har-
bor for the hosting of third party content set forth 
in Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/
EC.56 Accordingly, liability for copyright infringe-
ment could be avoided by providing for appropri-
ate notice-and-take-down procedures.
35	 The decision of the German Federal Court of Justice 
is of particular interest because it shows a further 
consequence of the current restrictive EC framework 
for copyright limitations. As the hybrid concept of 
precisely defined exceptions and the three-step test 
does not offer sufficient room to maneuver for the 
courts, alternative routes are chosen to arrive at sat-
isfactory results. The assumption of implicit con-
sent, for instance, appears as an attempt to bypass 
the inflexible copyright limitation infrastructure al-
together. It is questionable whether this solution is 
consistent. Virtually, the German Federal Court of 
Justice introduced a flexible element through the 
back door of doubtful assumptions on the intentions 
of a copyright owner making her works available on 
the Internet.   
IV. Need for Change
36	 In sum, case law from several EC member states tes-
tifies to substantial shortcomings in the present EC 
framework for copyright limitations.57 As demon-
strated by the Dutch and French cases, legal cer-
tainty is minimized under the current legal regime 
because the application of the open-ended three-
step test imposes further constraints on exceptions 
that are defined precisely in the national laws of EC 
member states. With its abstract criteria, the three-
step test erodes the legal certainty that could result 
from a precise definition of use privileges. The deci-
sions in Germany, moreover, show that the narrow 
definition of exceptions renders the limitation sys-
tem incapable of reacting adequately to advanced 
online information services. 
37	 The discussed case law confirms that the current 
EC regulation of copyright limitations offers neither 
legal certainty nor sufficient flexibility. When it is 
considered that, in addition, law making in the EC 
is much slower than in individual countries, it be-
comes apparent that the current regulation of limita-
tions in the EC is a worst-case scenario.58 The process of 
updating EC copyright legislation requires not only 
lengthy negotiations at Community level but also 
national implementation acts in all member states. 
Therefore, reactions to unforeseen technological de-
velopments and new social, cultural, or economic 
needs will not only be slow, as in traditional conti-
nental European systems with precisely defined ex-
ceptions. In the EC, these reactions will be very slow, 
and far too slow to keep pace with the rapid devel-
opment of the Internet. 
38	 While the reported German cases give evidence of 
attempts to find loopholes for the creation of more 
breathing space by circumventing the current re-
strictive combination of exceptions and the three-
step test, it is obvious that these remedies are rather 
inconsistent and incompatible with the overall 
structure of copyright law. The right place to strike 
a proper balance between freedom and protection 
in copyright law is the regulation of copyright limi-
tations. Instead of inducing courts to invent around 
an overly restrictive framework for limitations, EC 
copyright law should provide the courts with the le-
gal instruments necessary to maintain copyright’s 
delicate balance even in times of rapid techno-
logical developments that constantly require fast 
adaptations. 
39	 In other words, the time is ripe to reconsider the reg-
ulation of copyright limitations in the EC. Taking the 
guidelines developed above as a starting point, it can 
be posited that reforms in the field of copyright lim-
itations should primarily seek to enhance flexibil-
ity in order to render the EC system capable of cop-
ing with the rapid development of the Internet and 
the ongoing evolution of socially valuable Internet 
services, such as platforms for user-generated con-
tent, enhanced search engine services, and access 
to digitized cultural material. The introduction of a 
fair use element in the field of copyright limitations 
seems indispensable to achieve this goal. More flexi-
bility is also required because the process of EC pol-
icy making in the field of copyright limitations is far 
too slow to maintain a closed system of precisely de-
fined exceptions that necessitates repeated legisla-
tive intervention. Given the social, cultural, and eco-
nomic concerns at stake, it would be irresponsible 
not to switch to more sustainable law making that 
includes flexible fair use elements.
40	 U.S. decisions on advanced search engine services, for 
instance, give evidence of the merits of a more flex-
ible legislative framework. With regard to Google’s 
image search service, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the display of image thumbnails by 
Google qualified as a fair use under the U.S. fair use 
doctrine. The Court grounded its analysis on the no-
tion of transformative use that, traditionally, con-
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stitutes an important factor capable of tipping the 
scales to a finding of fair use.59 Pointing out a sig-
nificant benefit to the public, the Court noted that 
“a search engine may be more transformative than 
a parody because a search engine provides an en-
tirely new use for the original work, while a par-
ody typically has the same entertainment purpose 
as the original work.”60 In this vein, the Court con-
cluded that 
“the significantly transformative nature of Google’s 
search engine, particularly in light of its public ben-
efit, outweighs Google’s superseding and commer-
cial uses of the thumbnails in this case. In reaching 
this conclusion, we note the importance of analyz-
ing fair use flexibly in light of new circumstances.”61
41	 This decision differs markedly from the outcome of 
the comparable German cases described above. Even 
though recognizing the benefits of advanced search 
engine services, German courts did not manage to 
provide the required breathing space within the cur-
rent inflexible system of copyright exceptions. The 
more flexible U.S. framework, by contrast, enables 
the courts to formulate an adequate answer reflect-
ing their favorable assessment of the search engine 
service on the basis of the U.S. system of copyright 
limitations. Decisions in the area of user-generated 
content also testify to efficient use of the room to 
maneuver offered by the U.S. fair use doctrine.62
42	 A further guideline can be derived from the analysis 
conducted above. While the need for a flexible lim-
itation infrastructure may occupy center stage in 
the light of challenges arising from the digital envi-
ronment, the benefits accruing from a high degree 
of legal certainty must not be neglected. Ideally, law 
making in the field of copyright limitations strives 
for sufficient flexibility without abandoning the fur-
ther goal of legal certainty. Therefore, reforms in EC 
copyright law should aim to transform the current 
system that offers neither flexibility nor legal cer-
tainty into a system that provides both sufficient 
flexibility to face the challenges of digital technol-
ogy and a high degree of legal certainty. 
D. International Three-
Step Test as a Model
43	 Interestingly, this fundamental improvement of the 
EC system does not necessarily require a fundamen-
tal change in the legislative framework. Any future 
regulation of EC limitations is likely to remain pre-
dominantly based on precisely defined exceptions, 
even if a flexible fair use element is included. Rather 
than abolishing long-standing EC exceptions in the 
course of introducing a broad fair use clause, the EC 
discussion on fair use will most probably lead to the 
maintenance of a comprehensive list of specific ex-
ceptions that is supplemented rather than replaced 
with an open-ended fair use clause.63 Allowing the 
identification of additional types of permissible un-
authorized use in the light of the individual circum-
stances of a given case, this fair use clause would 
nonetheless open up the currently closed catalogue 
of limitations that are permissible in the EC.
44	 Considering these determinants of an EC fair use doc-
trine, the three-step test that is already enshrined in 
Article 5(5) of the Copyright Directive appears as a 
logical starting point for future fair use initiatives.64 
Like traditional fair use legislation, the three-step 
test sets forth open-ended factors. The drafting his-
tory of the three-step test confirms that the flexible 
formula has its roots in the Anglo-American copy-
right tradition.65 Not surprisingly, a line between the 
criteria of the three-step test and the factors to be 
found in fair use provisions, such as the U.S. fair use 
doctrine, can easily be drawn. The prohibition of a 
conflict with a normal exploitation, for instance, re-
calls the fourth factor of the U.S. fair use doctrine 
“effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.”66 Given the appear-
ance of the three-step test in several EC Directives,67 
the provision can moreover be regarded as part of 
the acquis communautaire. 
45	 The introduction of an EC fair use doctrine on the 
basis of the three-step test, however, requires a sub-
stantial change in the current EC approach to the 
use and interpretation of the provision. The three-
step test would have to be redefined. Instead of perceiv-
ing and employing the test exclusively as a strait-
jacket of copyright limitations – a means of placing 
further constraints on precisely defined exceptions 
– it would be necessary to recognize that the open-
ended criteria of the test allow not only the restric-
tion but also the introduction and broadening of 
limitations. Interestingly, this more holistic under-
standing complies with the concept underlying the 
international three-step test (section 4.1). As the EC 
provision is modeled on the corresponding inter-
national norms, this first hurdle on the way toward 
an EC fair use doctrine is thus surmountable. An ad-
ditional question, however, is whether national fair 
use legislation is compatible with the international 
three-step test (section 4.2). If the international 
three-step test precludes the introduction of fair use 
at the national level, the test can hardly serve as a 
basis for an EC fair use doctrine. This fundamental 
question will be discussed before tracing the concep-
tual contours of a future EC fair use legislation based 
on the three-step test (section 4.3). 
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I. Enabling Function of 
the Three-Step Test
46	 In international copyright law, there can be little 
doubt that the three-step test does not only serve 
the purpose of restricting national copyright lim-
itations. At the 1967 Stockholm Conference for the 
Revision of the Berne Convention, the first three-
step test in international copyright law was devised 
as a flexible framework, within which national leg-
islators would enjoy the freedom of safeguarding 
national limitations and satisfying domestic social, 
cultural, and economic needs.68 The provision was in-
tended to serve as a basis of national copyright lim-
itations. Accordingly, Article 9(2) BC offers national 
law makers the freedom 
“… to permit the reproduction of such works in cer-
tain special cases, provided that such reproduction 
does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legit-
imate interests of the author. “
47	 Many use privileges that have become widespread 
at the national level are directly based on the inter-
national three-step test. A specific provision that 
permits the introduction of national exemptions for 
private copying, for instance, is sought in vain in 
international copyright law. It is the international 
three-step test that creates breathing space for the 
adoption of this copyright limitation at the national 
level. Further examples of national limitations rest-
ing on the international three-step test can easily be 
found in the copyright laws of Berne Union Mem-
bers, like the exemption of reproductions for re-
search purposes, the privilege of libraries, archives 
and museums to make copies for the purpose of pre-
serving cultural material, the exemption of repro-
ductions that are required for administrative, parlia-
mentary or judicial proceedings, or of reproductions 
made by hospitals and prisons. 
48	 The three-step test of Article 9(2) BC, therefore, 
clearly has the function of creating room for the in-
troduction of copyright limitations at the national 
level. Vested with this function, it made its way into 
Article 13 TRIPS and played a decisive role during 
the negotiations of the WIPO “Internet” Treaties.69 
In Article 10(1) WCT, it paved the way for agreement 
on limitations of the rights newly granted under the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty, including the right of mak-
ing available online as part of the general right of 
communication to the public.70 In consequence, 
all limitations on the right of making available, in-
cluding those listed in Article 5(3) of the EC Copy-
right Directive, rest on the international three-step 
test. Considering the international family of three-
step tests in Articles 9(2) BC, 13 TRIPS and 10(1) and 
(2) WCT, it becomes obvious that the provision, by 
far, is the most important and comprehensive in-
ternational basis for national copyright limitations. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that the 
test’s fundamental role in enabling limitations and 
enhancing the flexibility of the copyright system has 
been underlined in the context of the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty:
“It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 
permit Contracting Parties to carry forward and ap-
propriately extend into the digital environment lim-
itations and exceptions in their national laws which 
have been considered acceptable under the Berne 
Convention. Similarly, these provisions should be 
understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise 
new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate 
in the digital network environment.”71
49	 At the national level, the three-step test has been 
used in this enabling sense,72 for instance, in deci-
sions of the German Federal Court of Justice. In a 
1999 case concerning the Technical Information Li-
brary Hannover, the Court underlined the public 
interest in unhindered access to information. Ac-
cordingly, it offered support for the Library’s prac-
tice of copying and dispatching scientific articles on 
request by single persons and industrial undertak-
ings.73 The legal basis of this practice was the statu-
tory limitation for personal use in § 53 of the German 
Copyright Act. Under this provision, the authorized 
user need not necessarily produce the copy herself 
but is free to ask a third party to make the reproduc-
tion on her behalf. The Court admitted that the dis-
patch of copies came close to a publisher’s activity.74 
Nonetheless, it refrained from putting an end to the 
library practice by assuming a conflict with a work’s 
normal exploitation. Instead, the Court deduced an 
obligation to pay equitable remuneration from the 
three-step test, and enabled the continuation of the 
information service in this way.75 
In a 2002 decision concerning the scanning and stor-
ing of press articles for internal e-mail communica-
tion in a private company, the Court gave a further 
example of its flexible approach to the three-step 
test. It held that digital press reviews had to be 
deemed permissible under § 49(1) of the German 
Copyright Act just like their analogue counterparts, 
if the digital version – in terms of its functioning and 
potential for use – essentially corresponded to tra-
ditional analogue products.76 To overcome the prob-
lem of an outdated wording of § 49(1) that seemed 
to indicate the limitation’s confinement to press re-
views on paper,77 the Court stated that, in view of 
new technical developments, a copyright limitation 
may be interpreted extensively.78 Taking these con-
siderations as a starting point, the Court arrived at 
the conclusion that digital press reviews were per-
missible if articles were included in graphical for-
mat without offering additional functions, such as a 
text collection and an index. This extension of the 
analogue press review exception to the digital envi-
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ronment, the Court maintained, was in line with the 
three-step test.79
50	  Hence, the test can be used to enable limitations and 
enhance flexibility in copyright law. National leg-
islation using the three-step test as a basis for fair 
use legislation, however, goes beyond the described 
court decisions. It would allow the courts to create 
new limitations on the basis of the test’s abstract 
criteria instead of entrusting them merely with the 
flexible interpretation of pre-defined, specific excep-
tions in the light of the open-ended test criteria. In 
other words, national fair use legislation relying on the 
three-step test would “institutionalize” the function of en-
abling limitations which the international three-step 
test has because of its open-ended wording.
II. Three-Step Test and Fair Use 
51	 In this context, it is to be considered that doubt has 
been cast upon the compliance of national fair use 
legislation with the international three-step test. 
In particular, it has been asserted that a national 
fair use system did not qualify as a “certain special 
case” in the sense of the three-step test.80 The valid-
ity of this argument is questionable. Interpreting the 
three-step test of Article 13 TRIPS, the WTO Panel re-
porting on Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, 
for instance, did not endorse the view that fair use, 
by definition, was incompatible with the require-
ment of “certain special cases.” Instead, the Panel 
followed a more cautious approach:
“However, there is no need to identify explicitly each 
and every possible situation to which the exception 
could apply, provided that the scope of the excep-
tion is known and particularised. This guarantees a 
sufficient degree of legal certainty.”81
52	 In this way, the Panel left room for national copy-
right laws providing for fair use. Legal certainty is 
not necessarily an exclusive task of the legislator. It 
may be divided between law makers and judges. In 
fair use systems, the degree of legal certainty need 
not be lower than in systems with precisely defined 
statutory exceptions. The open factors constituting 
the fair use criteria allow the courts to determine 
“certain special cases” of permissible unauthorized 
use in the light of the individual circumstances of a 
given case. With every court decision, a further “spe-
cial case” becomes known, particularized, and thus 
“certain” in the sense of the three-step test. A suf-
ficient degree of legal certainty follows from estab-
lished case law instead of detailed legislation. For in-
stance, a sufficient degree of legal certainty can be 
attained in a system with a long-standing fair use 
tradition, such as the U.S. copyright system.82 
53	 Moreover, it is to be recalled that flexible law mak-
ing in the field of copyright limitations is a particu-
lar feature of the Anglo-American copyright tradi-
tion. At the international level, a WTO Panel can be 
expected to take into account both the continental 
European and the Anglo-American tradition of copy-
right law. The Panel’s formula of “a sufficient degree 
of legal certainty” can thus be understood to ensure 
that not only precisely defined civil law exceptions 
but also common law fair use limitations are capable 
of passing the test of “certain special cases.” Other-
wise, an entire legal tradition of copyright law would 
be discredited and declared incompatible with in-
ternational standards. The international three-step 
test, therefore, can hardly be understood to preclude 
national fair use legislation. With the open-ended 
factors of special cases, normal exploitation, legiti-
mate interests, and unreasonable prejudice, the test 
itself is a source of inspiration for flexible law mak-
ing in the field of copyright limitations rather than 
an obstacle to the introduction of national fair use 
systems. 
III. Toward an EC Fair Use Doctrine
54	 In this vein, an EC fair use doctrine can be estab-
lished on the basis of the three-step test embodied 
in Article 5(5) of the Copyright Directive. As the in-
ternational three-step test does not militate against 
national fair use legislation, policy makers in the 
EC are free to model an EC fair use doctrine on the 
test’s flexible, open-ended criteria. Such a provision 
based on the three-step test, and incorporated into 
the Copyright Directive as a new Article 5(5), could 
take the following shape:
“In certain special cases comparable to those re-
flected by the exceptions and limitations provided 
for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, the use of works or 
other subject-matter may also be exempted from the 
reproduction right provided for in Article 2 and/or 
the right of communication and making available 
to the public provided for in Article 3, provided that 
such use does not conflict with a normal exploita-
tion of the work or other subject-matter and does 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the rightholder.”83
55	 In line with this proposal, the exceptions currently 
enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article 5 
of the Copyright Directive would remain unchanged. 
The proposed wording, however, would make it clear 
that these exceptions are regarded as certain special 
cases in the sense of the three-step test. Accordingly, 
they can serve as a reference point for the identifica-
tion of further cases of permissible unauthorized use 
on the basis of the proposed EC fair use doctrine. It 
follows from this approach that these further cases 
would have to be comparable with those reflected 
in the enumerated exceptions, for instance, in the 
sense that they serve comparable purposes or are 
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justified by comparable policies. The catalogue of 
explicitly listed EC exceptions would thus fulfill the 
same function as the indication of purposes, “such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching […], 
scholarship, or research,” in Section 107 of the U.S. 
Copyright Act. 
56	 Recalibrating the interplay between the catalogue of 
permissible exceptions and the open-ended three-
step test in this way, the proposed fair use provision 
would also ensure that the current dysfunctional 
system – no flexibility, no legal certainty – is trans-
formed into a consistent system attaining both ob-
jectives. Sufficient flexibility results from use of the 
three-step test as an opening clause that allows the 
courts to further develop the limitation infrastruc-
ture by devising new exceptions on the basis of the 
examples given in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Arti-
cle 5. For instance, the proposed provision would al-
low the courts to offer additional breathing space for 
advanced search engine services in those EC mem-
ber states that do not provide for a right of quota-
tion flexible enough to cover unauthorized use for 
the purpose of searching the Internet. Given the un-
derlying rationale of supporting freedom of expres-
sion and information, the policy justifying the in-
troduction of new use privileges in this area can be 
deemed comparable with those reflected by the right 
of quotation, the press privileges, and the excep-
tions for private copying that are part of the Arti-
cle 5 catalogue.
57	 Furthermore, the change in the use of the three-
step test would enhance the degree of legal certainty 
provided by the EC system. The proposed redefini-
tion of the three-step test would prevent the courts 
from employing the test as a means to place addi-
tional constraints on statutory exceptions that are 
defined precisely in national legislation. By contrast, 
the abstract criteria of the test could only be invoked 
to devise new exceptions. They would no longer be 
available as an additional control mechanism and 
a straitjacket of specific copyright limitations. As 
a result, the legal certainty resulting from the pre-
cise definition of use privileges at the national level 
would no longer be eroded through the additional 
application of the open-ended three-step test. In 
case of precisely defined national exceptions, users 
of copyrighted material could rely on the scope fol-
lowing from the wording of the respective national 
provisions. There would be no need to speculate on 
the outcome of an additional scrutiny in the light of 
the three-step test that makes it difficult to foresee 
the exception’s definite ambit of operation.
58	 When compared with the lamentable current state 
of the regulation of copyright limitations in the EC, 
the adoption of the proposed fair use provision based 
on the three-step test would thus improve the limi-
tation infrastructure substantially. Instead of mini-
mizing both flexibility and legal certainty, the pro-
posed redefinition of the three-step test in Article 
5(5) of the Copyright Directive would ensure suffi-
cient flexibility to cope with the challenges of the 
rapid development of the Internet and, at the same 
time, enhance the degree of legal certainty that can 
be achieved on the basis of a precise definition of 
exceptions.
E. Conclusion and International 
Perspective
59	 The EC system of copyright limitations is dysfunc-
tional. The traditional continental European ap-
proach to copyright limitations promotes legal cer-
tainty by providing for precisely defined exceptions. 
In the Anglo-American copyright tradition, open-
ended fair use legislation enhances flexibility. The 
current EC regulation of copyright limitations, how-
ever, fails to realize any of these potential advan-
tages. The three-step test enshrined in Article 5(5) of 
the Copyright Directive offers flexible, open-ended 
factors. However, this flexibility is not used to cre-
ate additional breathing space for copyright limita-
tions that is required in the digital environment. By 
contrast, the three-step test is applied to further re-
strict exceptions that are already defined precisely 
in the national laws of EC member states. 
60	 Applying open-ended factors to precisely defined 
statutory exceptions, the legal certainty that could 
follow from the precise definition of use privileges 
is minimized. In consequence, the current EC system 
offers neither legal certainty nor sufficient flexibil-
ity. When it is considered that, in addition, law and 
policy making in the EC is much slower than in in-
dividual countries, it becomes obvious that the cur-
rent legal framework is a worst-case scenario. With 
use privileges being forced into an inflexible legis-
lative straitjacket, the EC limitation infrastructure is 
rendered incapable of keeping pace with the rapid 
development of the Internet. Important opportuni-
ties for social, cultural, and economic development 
offered by innovative online platforms and services 
are likely to be missed. 
61	 As a way out, it is indispensable to incorporate flex-
ible fair use elements into the EC system. This solu-
tion need not lead to a radical structural change. In 
particular, it is unnecessary to sacrifice long-stand-
ing EC exceptions on the altar of a broad fair use pro-
vision. By contrast, it would be sufficient to take full 
advantage of the flexibility inherent in the three-
step test that has already become a cornerstone of 
EC legislation in the field of copyright limitations. As 
in international copyright law, the three-step test 
would have to be perceived and used as a flexible 
balancing tool that can be employed to broaden ex-
isting limitations and introduce new use privileges. 
In this way, an appropriate limitation infrastruc-
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ture could be established, for instance, to support 
advanced search engine services, the digitization 
of cultural material, and online platforms for user-
generated content.
62	 To achieve the indispensable redefinition of the 
three-step test, future EC fair use legislation should 
use the current catalogue of exceptions in Article 5 
of the Copyright Directive as examples of “certain 
special cases” in the sense of the three-step test. The 
courts should be entrusted with the task of identify-
ing comparable further cases of permissible unau-
thorized use on the basis of the test’s abstract crite-
ria of “no conflict with a normal exploitation” and 
“no unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests.” 
As a result, the three-step test could no longer be ap-
plied as an additional control mechanism and strait-
jacket of precisely defined exceptions. It would be 
prevented from eroding the legal certainty following 
from the precise definition of use privileges. Serving 
instead as an opening clause that supplements the EC 
catalogue of specific exceptions, the three-step test 
would provide the enhanced flexibility necessary to 
benefit from the rapid development of the Internet.
63	 An EC fair use doctrine based on the three-step test 
would not only remedy the shortcomings of the cur-
rent EC system. It can also be expected to have a ben-
eficial effect on the further harmonization of copy-
right limitations at the international level.84 The 
proposed EC fair use doctrine would reflect a bal-
anced, holistic approach to the three-step test. At the 
international level, the open-ended criteria of the 
three-step test have always been intended to pro-
vide a flexible framework, within which national leg-
islators enjoy the freedom of safeguarding national 
limitations and satisfying domestic social, cultural, 
and economic needs.85 Not only the restriction of ex-
cessive copyright limitations but also the broaden-
ing of important use privileges and the introduction 
of appropriate new exemptions fall within the test’s 
field of application. What is proposed here, in other 
words, is a renaissance of the initial understanding 
of the three-step test – a renaissance of the test as 
a refined proportionality test that offers breathing 
space for unauthorized use within reasonable lim-
its.86 The reinforcement of this balanced understand-
ing of the test is central to the international debate 
on copyright limitations. It challenges the false rhet-
oric of a three-step test that is primarily designed to 
restrict all kinds of copyright limitations. 
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